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FUTURE EXCHANGE RATES AND SIEGEL’S PARADOX
KEIVAN MALLAHI-KARAI AND PEDRAM SAFARI
Abstract. Siegel’s paradox is a fundamental question in international trade about
exchange rates for futures contracts and has puzzled many scholars for over forty
years. The unorthodox approach presented in this article leads to an arbitrage-free
solution which is invariant under currency re-denominations and is symmetric, as
explained. We will also give a complete classification of all such aggregators in
the general case. The formula obtained in this setting therefore describes all the
negotiated no-arbitrage forward exchange rates in terms of a reciprocity function.
Keywords: international trade, forward exchange rates, futures contract, discount
bias, Siegel’s paradox
1. Introduction
Siegel’s paradox, discussed by Siegel (1972), is a discount bias in future exchange
rates and is often discussed in connection with Nalebuff (1989) puzzle in the context
of expected values. It can briefly be described in simple terms as follows. Let us
assume that there are two possible states of the world ω1 and ω2 at a specific time T
in the future, both having an equal chance of 50% of occurring, where the exchange
rate of Euros to US dollars is expected to be e1 and e2, respectively. It appears that
an investor who wants to exchange Euros to US dollars at time T would consider the
expected value 1
2
(e1+e2) as the spot price for a futures contract at time 0. Meanwhile,
for their trading counterpart, who wants to perform the reciprocal exchange of US
dollars to Euros, this price would be 1
2
(e−11 + e
−1
2 ) in their own currency, which is
an obvious disagreement. This is the content of Siegel’s paradox — that these (risk-
neutral) investors cannot both opt for the arithmetic mean as the spot price for a
futures contract. In other words, the source of the paradox lies in the fact that the
arithmetic and harmonic means do not coincide.
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2 FUTURE EXCHANGE RATES AND SIEGEL’S PARADOX
It should not be surprising that this problem is of great significance in international
trade. The Bank for International Settlements estimates that the daily turnover in
foreign exchange markets far exceeds $1 trillion (Obstfeld & Rogoff (1996)). There
have been numerous theoretical attempts at understanding this paradox, as well as
enormous amount of empirical testing. To begin with, Siegel (1972) seems to have
viewed it not as a paradox, but as a relationship between foreign exchange prices and
interest rates under risk neutrality. However, in the absence of interest rates, the
paradox will not fade away. He suggested that the investors in the ”small country”
choose a biased estimator, as their own forward rate, which lies between the geometric
and harmonic means. Roper (1975) suggested that the paradox may be resolved if the
investors take their forward profits in the foreign currency. However, if the investors
wish to take their profits in their own domestic currencies, they have to be risk-averse
(Beenstock (1985)). A nice overview of Siegel’s paradox could be found in Edlin
(2002). None of the proposed solutions, to our knowledge, suggests a specific forward
exchange rate that is acceptable to risk-neutral investors in both currencies.
In their classic text on international macroeconomics, Obstfeld & Rogoff (1996)
dedicate an entire section to Siegel’s paradox and its ramifications. They analyze the
empirical tests for prediction bias in forward rates in detail and develop a stochastic
monetary model to understand forward exchange pricing. They explain that in their
model, if (relative) purchasing power parity holds, the expected real returns will be
zero for one party if it is zero for the other, but the argument fails when the PPP fails
for any reason. They also suggest that the forward exchange rate in the equilibrium
ends up to be a negotiated rate between the expected value of the future spot rate
from one investor’s perspective and that of their counterpart — in other words, if ET
is the future spot rate at time T in the future, the negotiated rate will be between
E(ET ) and 1/E(1/ET ), which is consistent with our findings.
In this paper, we take a non-traditional approach and seek an aggregator that
is arbitrage-free, symmetric and invariant under redenominations. These conditions
will be defined precisely in the next section. We will show that under these natural
axioms, the only possible aggregator for Siegel’s paradox will be the geometric mean.
Note that for any pair of positive numbers, the geometric mean always lies between
the arithmetic and harmonic means. We will go even further and give a complete
classification of the aggregators satisfying the generalized axioms in any dimension.
The main result (Theorem 4.2) gives a formula for these aggregators in terms of the
geometric mean and a reciprocity function.
Our approach not only provides an unbiased common ground to the exchange
problem in Siegel’s paradox, but might eventually even shed a new light in under-
standing other questions in future discount rates, such as in the Weitzman-Gollier
puzzle (Gollier & Weitzman (2010)).
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2. The Model
In this model, we will assume that there are two possible states of the world ω1
and ω2 at a fixed time T in the future. We consider the possible values of foreign
exchange rate (we use European and American currency) EUR/USD at time T and
assume that it can attain values
R
EUR/USD
(ω1) = e1, REUR/USD(ω2) = e2.
The reciprocal exchange rates for USD in terms of Euros will be 1/e1, 1/e2, that is,
R
USD/EUR
(ω1) = e
−1
1 , RUSD/EUR(ω2) = e
−1
2 .
Siegel’s paradox shows that investors who want to exchange Euros to US dollars
at time T and the ones who want to exchange US dollars to Euros at time T cannot
both use the arithmetic mean as the spot price for the futures contract at time 0.
Our point of view is that the arithmetic mean (or the expected value with respect
to probability distribution (1/2, 1/2)) is not the right “aggregator” to be used in this
context. We will consider three natural axioms that any reasonable aggregator must
satisfy. Underlying each axiom is what may be viewed as an invariance principle
stating the aggregate price must be preserved under certain transformations of the
given data. Surprisingly, these three axioms are strong enough to determine a unique
aggregator. Let us denote the aggregator by A (e1, e2). Our axioms are as follows.
• Symmetry. We will assume that there is no particular order on the two
possible states of the world, hence the aggregator must be indifferent to the
order in which the rates are listed. This implies that
A (e1, e2) = A (e2, e1).
• Re-denomination. Upon redenomination of currencies, say, replacing a Euro
by 100 Euro cents, the exchange rates have to be adjusted accordingly, here
by a factor of 100. More generally, if we denote the redenomination factor by
λ, the following identity must hold:
A (λe1, λe2) = λ ·A (e1, e2).
• Reciprocity. This axiom explicitly precludes what happens in Siegel’s para-
dox. It can also naturally be viewed as a no-arbitrage constraint for the ex-
change rates, stipulating that the aggregator prevents the possibility of making
risk-less money by exchanging Euros to Dollars and then back into Euros (as-
suming, obviously, that there are no transaction costs). This condition can be
expressed as
A (e−11 , e
−1
2 ) = A (e1, e2)
−1.
4 FUTURE EXCHANGE RATES AND SIEGEL’S PARADOX
3. The Geometric Mean
We will identify the set E of, say, EUR/USD (and USD/EUR) exchange rates with
the set of positive real numbers. An aggregator is a function A : E ×E → E, which
aggregates the two possible exchange rates e1, e2 into one deterministic rate A (e1, e2).
The following theorem gives a complete characterization of the aggregators A that
satisfy the Symmetry, Redenomination and Reciprocity axioms.
Theorem 3.1. Let A : E × E → E be an aggregator, which satisfies the following
axioms:
A1. Symmetry: For all e1, e2 ∈ E, we have A (e1, e2) = A (e2, e1).
A2. Redenomination: For all e1, e2 ∈ E and every λ > 0, we have
A (λe1, λe2) = λ ·A (e1.e2).
A3. Reciprocity: For all e1, e2 ∈ E, we have
A (e−11 , e
−1
2 ) = A (e1, e2)
−1.
Then,
A (e1, e2) =
√
e1e2
for all e1, e2 ∈ E.
Proof. It will be expedient to make a logarithmic change of coordinates. In order to
do this, we set α(x, y) = log(A (ex, ey)), where log denotes the natural logarithm.
It is easy to verify that A1–A3 correspond to the following properties of the new
function α, defined for all real numbers.
Aˆ1. For all x, y ∈ R, we have α(x, y) = α(y, x).
Aˆ2. For all x, y ∈ R, and all λ > 0, we have α(x+ λ, y + λ) = α(x, y) + λ.
Aˆ3. For all x, y ∈ R, we have α(−x,−y) = −α(x, y).
Now, we consider the difference
h(x, y) = α(x, y)− x+ y
2
.
It is clear that Aˆ1 and Aˆ3 imply
(1) h(x, y) = h(y, x) , h(−x,−y) = −h(x, y).
From Aˆ2 it follows that for all real values of λ, we have
(2) h(x+ λ, y + λ) = h(x, y).
Applying (2) to λ = −(x+ y), we get
h(x, y) = h(−y,−x) = −h(y, x) = −h(x, y),
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which shows that h(x, y) = 0. Hence α(x, y) =
x+ y
2
. Now, by translating this back
to the original variables, we obtain
A (e1, e2) = exp(α(log e1, log e2)) = exp
(
log e1 + log e2
2
)
=
√
e1e2.

Remark 3.2. Using the geometric mean as an aggregator has the following curious
interpretation. It is clear that from the point of view of an investor who is interested
in a Euro to USD exchange in the future, the value of the geometric mean aggregator
A (e1, e2) =
√
e1e2 can be seen as the expected value with respect to a new probability
distribution P[ω1] = p,P[ω2] = 1− p, hence
√
e1e2 = pe1 + (1− p)e2.
The new probability measure always gives a larger weight to the state of the world
in which ei is smaller. Similarly, the investor who wants to exchange US dollars to
Euros in the future can also view the value of the aggregator as the expected value
with respect to some probability measure. What is interesting is that this probability
measure assigns p to ω2 and 1− p to ω1. The reason for this is:
(1− p) 1
e1
+ p
1
e2
=
pe1 + (1− p)e2
e1e2
=
√
e1e2
e1e2
=
1√
e1e2
.
Remark 3.3. The proof of theorem 3.1 could be re-interpreted in the language of
group actions. To see this more clearly, let us consider the more general case of ag-
gregators with n variables A (e1, . . . , en). One can define analogously an n-variable
function h, which now should be invariant under all the permutations Pσ of the coor-
dinates, as well as the translation group Tλ along the vector eλ = (λ, λ, . . . , λ). More-
over, h has to be odd with respect to the reflection R across the origin. It is easy to see
that the group Γ generated by the transformations Pσ, Tλ and R is a finite extension of
a group isomorphic to the additive group of real numbers consisting of Tλ. In fact, any
element of this group can be represented by γ(x1, . . . , xn) = ǫ(γ)(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n))+eλ,
where ǫ(γ) = ±1, σ is a permutation, and λ ∈ R. Alternatively, one can represent
this group by matrices of the form (±Pσ λj
0 1
)
,
where Pσ is the permutation matrix associated to σ and j is the column vector whose
entries are all equal to 1. One can show that ǫ : Γ → {±1} is a character of Γ and
the axioms are in fact equivalent to the following condition on h acting on Γ-orbits:
h(γx) = ǫ(γ)h(x). When n = 2, the Γ-orbits are never injective, and this is indeed
the key to the uniqueness part of the theorem. For n ≥ 3, however, one can see that
the Γ-action is generically free, that is the map γ 7→ γ · x is a bijection.
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4. The General Case
Our approach gives a deterministic answer to Siegel’s paradox when there are two
equally likely exchange rates in the future, namely that the geometric mean is the only
possible aggregator subject to Symmetry, Redenomination and Reciprocity axioms.
One might think of other variations of this problem as well, for example when there
are more than two such possible future exchange rates e1, . . . , en. An aggregator then
is a function A : En → E, where En denotes the n-fold Cartesian product of E with
itself. We formulate the following axioms:
A1. Symmetry: For all e1, . . . , en ∈ E, we have A (e1, . . . , en) = A (eσ(1), . . . , eσ(n))
for any permutation σ of the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
A2. Scaling: For all e1, . . . , en ∈ E and every λ > 0, we have
A (λe1, . . . , λen) = λ ·A (e1, . . . , en).
A3. Reciprocity: For all e1, . . . , en ∈ E, we have
A (e−11 , . . . , e
−1
n ) = A (e1, . . . , en)
−1.
Having known the result for two rates, it would be natural to assume that the n-
aggregator in this case should again be the geometric mean A (e1, . . . , en) = n
√
e1 . . . en.
This function definitely satisfies the generalized axioms we have proposed above and
would be the aggregator of choice. However, as the following proposition shows, this
is not the only possibility. Let us call a collection of functions log-convex if their
logarithms constitute a convex set. Recall that a set is convex if for any two points
A0 and A1 in the set and any α ∈ [0, 1], the convex combination (1− α)A0 + αA1 is
also in the set.
Proposition 4.1. For n > 2, there are infinitely many aggregators A : En → E
satisfying axioms A1–A3. The collection of all such aggregators is log-convex.
Proof. Let e(1) ≤ · · · ≤ e(n) denote the order statistics of the sequence e1, . . . , en.
In other words, e(1) is the minimum of e1, . . . , en, e
(2) is the second smallest term,
etc. For n ≥ 3, let A (e1, . . . , en) denote the median of e1, . . . , en. When n is odd,
this is defined to be e(
n+1
2
), and when n is even, it is defined to be
√
e(
n
2
)e(
n
2
+1). We
are going to show that the median is an aggregator satisfying A1–A3. Notice that
the order statistics are invariant under permutations and scale with λ > 0 when the
original sequence is scaled. It remains to prove A3. Note that the order statistics for
1/e1, . . . , 1/en are simply 1/e
(n) ≤ · · · ≤ 1/e(1). This proves the claim.
One can verify that if A0 and A1 are two aggregators satisfying A1–A3, and
α ∈ [0, 1], then Aα = A 1−α0 A α1 is also an aggregator satisfying A1–A3. One can
also check that these aggregators are all different if A0 and A1 are different (in this
case, the geometric mean and the median). This proves that there are infinitely many
aggregators. Moreover, since logAα is a convex combination of logA0 and logA1,
the collection of aggregators satisfying A1–A3 is log-convex. 
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We can in fact go further and characterize all aggregators satisfying A1–A3 in
any dimension. As before, consider the order statistics e(1) ≤ · · · ≤ e(n) and form
the consecutive ratios e(n)/e(n−1), e(n−1)/e(n−2), . . . , e(2)/e(1). We have the following
general characterization theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Any aggregator A : En → E satisfying A1–A3 is of the form
(3) A (e1, . . . , en) = (e1 . . . en)
1/nβ(e(n)/e(n−1), . . . , e(2)/e(1)),
where β : (R≥1)n−1 → R+ is a function satisfying β(u1, . . . , un−1)β(un−1, . . . , u1) = 1.
Conversely, for any such function β, the aggregator A defined by (3) satisfiesA1–A3.
For simplicity, let us call a function β satisfying β(u1, . . . , un−1)β(un−1, . . . , u1) = 1
a reciprocity function. Note that the constant function β = 1 is always a reciprocity
function, and using it in formula (3) produces the familiar geometric mean aggregator.
For a non-trivial example, let n = 3 and take β(u1, u2) = (u2/u1)
1/3 to obtain the
median as another aggregator, as we have verified before.
Proof. Let us prove the converse first. For any aggregator A defined as above, we
can see that it satisfies A1–A3 by verifying how the two factors on the right-hand
side of the formula transform under symmetry, scaling and reciprocals. We know how
(e1 . . . en)
1/n transforms, because it already satisfies A1–A3. It is also pretty clear
that the value of β(e(n)/e(n−1), . . . , e(2)/e(1)) is invariant under a scaling of e1, . . . , en,
as well as their permutations, so all we need to check is how it transforms if e1, . . . , en
are replaced by their reciprocals e1
−1, . . . , en
−1; this will just reverse the order of the
variables e(n)/e(n−1), . . . , e(2)/e(1), so we get the reciprocal value for β, since it is a
reciprocity function.
This argument meanwhile implies that if formula (3) holds, then the aggregator
A automatically satisfies A1 and A2, and satisfies A3 exactly when the function β
is a reciprocity function, since the n-tuple (e(n)/e(n−1), . . . , e(2)/e(1)) can assume any
arbitrary value in (R≥1)n−1 by an appropriate choice of e1, . . . , en.
Now, let us prove the other direction of the theorem. Since A is invariant under
permutations, we can assume without loss of generality that e1 ≤ · · · ≤ en. We now
need to establish the existence of a reciprocity function β : (R+)n−1 → R+ such that
A (e1, . . . , en) = (e1 . . . en)
1/nβ(en/en−1, . . . , e2/e1).
As in the case of n = 2, we set
h(x1, . . . , xn) = log(A (e
x1, . . . , exn))− x1 + · · ·+ xn
n
.
One can again see that as a result of A1–A3, h is symmetric, translation-invariant,
and satisfies h(−x1, . . . ,−xn) = −h(x1, . . . , xn). For u1, . . . , un−1 ∈ R+, set
β(un−1, un−2, . . . , u1) = exp(h(0, log u1, log(u1u2), . . . , log(u1 . . . un−1)).
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The claim now follows by combining these formulas for e1 = e
x1 , . . . , en = e
xn. We
just need to keep in mind that, by translation invariance,
h(x1, . . . , xn) = h(0, x2 − x1, . . . , xn − x1).
As we noted earlier, since formula (3) holds and A satisfies the reciprocity axiom
A3, β has to be a reciprocity function. However, to see this explicitly, write
h(0, log u1, log(u1u2), . . . , log(u1 . . . un−1) = −h(0,− log u1, . . . ,− log(u1 . . . un−1))
= −h(log(u1 . . . un−1), log((u2 . . . un−1)), . . . , 0)
= −h(0, log un−1, . . . , log(u1 . . . un−1)),
where we have translated the variables by log(u1 . . . un−1) in the second step and
used symmetry in the last. Exponentiating the first and the last terms here produce
β(un−1, un−2, . . . , u1) and β(u1, u2, . . . , un−1)
−1. 
5. Discussion
We have been able to classify all aggregators satisfying A1–A3 in terms of the
geometric mean and a reciprocity function β, as in theorem 4.2. For n = 2, this
function β is identical to 1, so we obtain a unique aggregator in this case, but there are
plenty of options in other cases. It would be interesting to find out an interpretation
of the reciprocity function β in economic terms. This could help our understanding
of aggregators and may even point to some natural axioms or constraints that could
narrow down the possibilities for an aggregator or even determine it uniquely. In all
cases, however, the geometric mean stands out as the trivial aggregator of choice.
Another direction in which the problem could be generalized would be when the
future exchange rates e1, . . . , en are not necessarily equally likely, but occur with
probabilities p1, . . . , pn, respectively. It would be fair to assume that the following
weighted geometric mean would be the natural aggregator in this case.
(4) A (e1, . . . , en) = e
p1
1 e
p2
2 . . . e
pn
n .
One could in fact argue for this aggregator, at least when p1, . . . , pn are all rational
numbers, but should take extra care in interpreting the Symmetry axiom A1. To
demonstrate this case, let us assume that there are only two possible future exchange
rates e1 and e2, occurring with probabilities m/(m+ n) and n/(m+ n), respectively.
We can recast this situation as the case of m+n equally likely future exchange rates,
wherem of those possibilities are e1 and the rest are e2. Then we can apply theorem 4.2
to find all the aggregators in this case, in particular our distinguished geometric mean,
which would be a weighted one, as suggested in equation (4). This argument could be
adapted to extend to any number of future exchange rates with rational probabilities,
but runs into difficulty when the probabilities p1, . . . , pn, contain irrational numbers.
Fixing this issue may require an appropriate modification of the Symmetry axiom or
formulation of an additional Continuity axiom to extend the results to the general
case and could open up new avenues for investigation.
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